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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the Honorable

John F. Wahlquist denying petitioner's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

District Court Judge John F. Wahlquist of the Second Judicial District Court denied petitioner's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in a memorandum decision
dated March 16, 1972, after a hearing at which both
appellant and respondent appeared, were represented by
counsel, and presented testimony and argument to the
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court. The petition was denied on the bases that the
issues raised were res judicata because of e.n earlier habeai
corpus proceeding by this petitioner and because no
factual showing was made by petitioner which would
support his petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit that the judgment of the!
Second Judicial District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents stipulated to appellant's statement
of the facts except as follows:
The attorney who represented petitioner at the time
of his plea and sentencing, Mr. L. G. Bingham, specifically
stated that he had never promised anyone, including the
petitioner, that they would get probation (T. 26, R. 110):
that he always discussed the seriousness of the chargse I
with his clients, especially in a felony situation (T. 27,
R. 111); that he had never allowed anyone including
petitioned to plead guilty to a felony if they claimed
they were innocent (T. 27 and 29, R. 111 and 113); that I
it definitely was his practice to review the entire case I
with his client and to discuss the particular elements of .
the crime with the client (T. 28, R. 112); and that it was
his general practice to discuss relevant court procedures
with a client in the event the case should go to trial
(T. 28, R. 112).
Judge Wahlquist's opinion, dated March 16, 1972.
was specifically based on two grounds, namely that the
issues raised were res judicata because of the 1968 habeas
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corpus petition and proceedings, and second, because

there was not sufficient factual showing to support petitioner's contention.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE ISSUES RAISED
WERE RES JUDICATA BECAUSE THE
GROUNDS ALLEGED FOR SUCH WRIT
EXISTED AND COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BY APPELLANT IN HIS PREVIOUS
As appellant concedes, the Utah Supreme Court has
repeatedly held in cases involving a petitioner's second
writ of habeas corpus that:
"Since plaintiff could have tendered these
issues upon which he now seeks relief in the first
proceeding, but failed to do so, he is barred from
presenting them for judicial determination. The
issue of the validity of his detention is res judicata." Rees v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 441, 491 P. 2d
1093 (1971).
See also Mayna,rd u. Turner, ____ Utah 2d ______ , ------ P. 2d
___ (No. 12703 filed September 18, 1972) ;Maxwell u.
Turner, 23 Utah 2d 12, 455 P. 2d 912 (1969); Dodge u.
Turner, 12 Utah 2d 341, 445 P. 2d 7fJ7 (1968); Wood u.
Turner, 19 Utah 2d 133, 427 P.2d 397 (1967); Burleigh
v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1964).
Petitioner attempts to distinguish this line of cases
by emphasiizng the word "could" insofar as a petitioner
"could" haive raised an issue in an earlier petition. The
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The principle of barring successive habeas corpU\
proceedings is well founded in strong policy considera.
tions. The Utah Supreme Court has stated;
"Policy would seem to indicate that when a
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his entire
relief, based upon his entire claim, then the matt<:r
should be laid to rest. He should be denied a
second attempt at substantially the same objective
under a different guise." Wheadon u. Pearson, 14
Utah 2d 45, 376 P. 2d 946 (1962).
The doctrine of res judicata is to be applied:
" ... not only to points and issues which are
actually raised and decided therein but also to
such as could have been therein adjudicated...."
East Mill Creek Water Co. u. Salt Lake City,
108 Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863 (1945).
The policy of discouraging successive habeas corpus petitions is specifically embodied in the requirement of Rule
65B (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which re·
quires that a petitioner allege that the legality of his
confinement has not been previously adjudicated.
Respondents respectfully submit that neither of the
federal cases cited by appellant serve as proper authority
to upset the long line of Utah cases establishing the appli·
cability of the doctrine of res judicata to state
corpus p:oceedings, and that the district court correctly
dismissed appellant's petition because of the 1968 peti·
tion and hearing at which appellant have raised the issues
he now relies upon.

7

POINT II
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS VALID
UNDER THE LAW EXISTING AT THE
TIME IT WAS GIVEN AND REMAINS
VALID BECAUSE RECENTLY ADOPTED
STANDARDS REGARDING GUILTY PLEAS
DO NOT OPERATE RETROACTIVELY TO
VOID SUCH PLEAS.
The standards by which guilty pleas should be judged
by a reviewing court were changed by the case of Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274
(1969). The pre-Boykin standard for guilty pleas in the
Tenth Circuit was clearly set forth in the case of Arbuckle
v. Turner 306 F. Supp. 825 (C.D. Utah 1969). The district court said:
"Prior to the Boykin decision, due process was
concerned with whether voluntariness and understanding existed, and not with the manner or
means by which they came to exist. . . . A Utah
trial judge may assume in the usual circumstance
that a defendant is well advised by his counsel.
The rule in the Tenth Circuit has been that a
representation by defendant's attorney to the trial
court that he has so advised the defendant coupled
with the acquiescence of a defendant who appears
to comprehend what is being done indicates that
a valid plea has been entered (citations). Although
we do not reach the question of whether such
record is sufficient after Boykin, the rule will continue to have validity for pre-Boykin cases." Ibid.
p. 827-8.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit this decision was
affinned with the Court further stating:
"And we do not believe that a detennination
i

I

I
I

!
I
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of guilty plea's voluntariness depends on a detailed showing of waiver of the three lights stressed
by appellant. The trial court's determination to
voluntariness covered the foundamentals of com.
prehension of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea. . . . We view the further
proof relating to the several rights emphasized by
appellant as part of the facts and circumstances
to be considered in determining whether the plea
was intelligently and voluntarily made, as the trial
court did." Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F. 2d 586 •
(10th Cir. 1971).
.
These cases plainly stand for the propoc·ition that
pre-Boykin guilty pleas should be judged by a standard
of voluntariness and understanding, but that the specific
methods used to make such a determination are not
critical. The trial court in considering a petition for writ
of habeas corpus cay consider all relevant sources of .
information, not just the original record, in determining
whether a guilty plea was properly accepted.
Respondents submit that appellant was not denied
any constitutional rights by the acceptance of his guilty .
plea, and that such has been properly determined by a
competent reviewing court applying the applicable stand·
ard of review for pre- Boykin guilty pleas. Judge Wahl·
quist's memorandum decision (R. 73-76) adequately sets
forth findings of fact which support his conclusion that
appellant's rights "were not prejudiced in any way by
the failure of Judge Norseth to discuss these matters with
him in open court." (R. 276).
The Utah Supreme Court has held:
" ... the question as to whether he (the peti·
ti oner) was accorded the right of counsel and was
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properly advised as to the consequences of his
plea of guilty are primarily questions of fact. The
trial court having heard the evidence relating
thereto and having found the issues against the
plaintiff, it is our further duty to indulge the usual
credit due his findings and judgment." Brown v.
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968, 970 (1968).
The only evidence suporting appellant's claims regarding his guilty plea were his own statements, about
which this Court has recently said, "The trial judge was
not obligated to believe the self-serving testimony of the
plaintiff." Jenhins v. Turner, ______ Utah 2d ______ , ______ P. 2d
(1972), Case No. 12769, filed October 16, 1972.
Appellant's reliance on the case of McCarthy u.
United States, 349 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed 2d
418 (1969) is ill-founded to support the contention that
the trial court's duty to make a record of the guilty plea
acceptance is a duty of constitutional proportions. The
Supreme Court expressly limited this decision by its statements that:
"This decision is based solely upon our construction of Rule 11 and is made pursuant to our
supervisory power over the lower federal courts;
we do not reach any of the constitutional arguments petitioner urges as additional grounds for
reversal." Ibid. at 464.
Appellant's contention that the Boykin decision
should be given retroactive effect is likewise settled in the
Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the reasoning found in the case of Halliday u. United States, 394
lJ.S. 831, 89 S. Ct. 1498, 23 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1969) which
considered the retroactive effect to be given to the case of
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McCarthy u. United States, supra. The Supreme Court
said:
"Thus in view of the general application of
in McCarthy, and in view of the large number of
constitutionally valid convictions that may have
been obtaind without full compliance with Rule 11
Rule 11 in a manner inconsistent with our
we decline to apply McCarthy retroactively."
Halliday, supra, p. 833.
The Tenth Circuit stated:
"The courts and prosecuting authorities were
not advised of a constitutional requirement of an
affirmative record showing of voluntariness until
the Boy kin decision and both proceeded in reliance
on prior practice. The effort of retrocative application would obviously be to throw in jeopardy many
pleas in fact voluntarily and intelligently made,
but accepted without an affirmatiYe record show·
ing thereon. . . . Thus both the reliance factor
and the adverse effect on the administration of
justice argue persuasively against retroactivity."
Perry u. Crouse, 429 F. 2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1970).
This rejection of the retrocative effect of Boykin has
been adhered to by the Tenth Circuit in the subsequent
cases of Arbuckle u. Turner, supra, and Freeman v. Page,
443 F. 2d 493 (10th Cir. 1971).

i
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i
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Both the Halliday case, supra, and the Perry case, ,
supra, examined the three criteria urged by appellant in
his brief (p. 18) as applicable to judging the retroactive
effect of a newly enunciated rule, and both cases ruled
for the non-retroactive effect of rules relating to guilty
plea procedure. Appellant urges that the purpose of the
Boykin rule is such as would outweigh both the reliance
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element and the effect on justice elements of this three
part test. The Perry case, however, stated:
". . . the basic purpose involved would not be
sacrificed by prospective application of the Boykin
case since that decision did not introduce the
rule that a plea must be made voluntarily and
intelligently to be valid." Perry, supra, p. 1084.
Appellant cites the case of Belgrade v. Turner, 307
F. Supp. 936 (Utah 1969) which predates the Arbuckle
decision by two and one half months and which cannot
be considered good precedent for the proposition that
Boykin should be applied retrocatively, if indeed it could
ever have been so considered.
The case of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) adds nothing to the
standard for judging guilty pleas as discussed above;
neither does it indicate that Boykin should be applied
retroactively.
The following cases exemplify the overwhelming authority against applying the Boykin decision retroactively:
Hughes v. Rundle, 419 F. 2d 118 (3rd Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A. 2d 923 (1969);
State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1, 457 P. 2d 331 (1969) ;
Ernst v. State, 43 Wisc. 2d 661, 170 N.W. 2d 713 (1969);
Endsley v. Cupp, 459 P. 2d 448 (Or. App. 1969) (dictum);
In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P. 2d 449
(1969); Montayne v. State, 7 Md. App. 627, 256 A. 2d
706 (1969); Ward v. People, 472 P. 2d 673 (Colo. 1970);
Reynolds v. Warden, 89 Nev. 941, 478 P.2d 574 (1970);
State L Guy. 81 N.M. 641, 471 P. 2d 675 (1970).
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CONCLUSION
Respondents submit that the trial court properh
denied appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus
cause appellant had previously (1968) filed a similai
petition and had a hearing to determine the
·
of his incarceration. Appellant should, or could haw
known and raised issues in his present petition and hi•
failure to do so makes such issues res judicata.
Respondents further submit that the Boyhin easel
has not and should not be given retrocative effect as ai
constitutional standard relating to guilty pleas. Appellanl)
herein was given an opportunity to present evidence tD
show some infringement upon his constitutional righfa.
The Second District Court heard such evidence and con.
eluded that none of appellant's constitutional rights were 1
prejudiced by the manner in which his original guilty plei
.I
was accepted. Therefore, respondents respectfully subIllll :
that the judgment of the Second Judicial District Court
should be affirmed.
1

1
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Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
:
Chief Assistant Attorney General I
KENT S. LEWIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

